An Efficiency Analysis of Contracts for the Provision of Telephone Services to Prisons by Carver, Justin
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 54 | Issue 3 Article 2
5-2002
An Efficiency Analysis of Contracts for the
Provision of Telephone Services to Prisons
Justin Carver
Mariea & Sigmund, L.L.C.
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Communications Law Commons,
Contracts Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carver, Justin (2002) "An Efficiency Analysis of Contracts for the Provision of Telephone Services to Prisons," Federal Communications
Law Journal: Vol. 54: Iss. 3, Article 2.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol54/iss3/2
An Efficiency Analysis of Contracts
for the Provision of Telephone Services
to Prisons
Justin Carver*
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 392
II. NATURE OF PRESENT CONTRACTS ............................................. 393
A. Exclusive Provider Provisions ............................................ 393
B. Calling Options .................................................................. 396
C. Cost of Calls ....................................................................... 396
D. States' Use of Revenue ....................................................... 400
E. The Need to Maximize Access to Telephones ....................... 401
III. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 ........................................ 401
A. Removal of Barriers to Entry .............................................. 402
B. Interconnection .................................................................. 402
C. Universal Service at Just Rates ........................................... 403
IV. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS .............................................................. 404
V. STRUCTURE OF THE CONTRACTS AND GAME THEORY ............... 407
A. The Payoff Matrix .............................................................. 407
1. State Incentives for Requiring Commissions ................. 407
2. Incentives for Utilizing an Exclusive Dealing
Provision ...................................................................... 409
B. Game Theory in the Awarding of Contracts ........................ 411
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACTS .................................................. 413
* The Author practices law at Mariea & Sigmund, L.L.C. in Jefferson City, Missouri,
and specializes in civil litigation and business law. The Author wishes to express his
gratitude to his wife and his colleagues for their continued support of this project, and to his
former law school professor, David Sloss, for his generous advice and counsel.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
A. Present Contracts ............................................................... 413
B. No Kickback, Competition .................................................. 414
C. Kickback Competition ....................................................... 416
D. State-Owned Enterprise ...................................................... 417
E. Comparison of Approaches ................................................ 417
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 419
I. INTRODUCTION
The prison population in the United States has dramatically increased
since the 1970s, and as recently as 1998, there were nearly two million
inmates incarcerated in the United States.' As the numbers of prisons and
prisoners continue to increase, so does the market for prison services.
Indeed, the prison industry has already grown into a multibillion-dollar
industry with its own trade shows and trade newspaper.2
One of the more lucrative segments of this industry is the telephone
market. In the prison context, the state contracts with a private entity, and
the private entity provides services to the prisoners and also to the state. To
the extent that the services are provided to the prisoners, the relationship
resembles a third party beneficiary contract. Due to the perverse financial
incentives and the political climate surrounding prisons and prisoners,
however, neither the state nor the private entity acts in the best interests of
the consumers in particular or of society in general.
With respect to the financial incentives, it is estimated that inmate
3
calls generate a billion dollars or more in annual revenue. One prison pay
phone can generate $15,000 annually; a typical public pay phone generates
only one-fifth of that amount.4 Faced with the possibility of such revenues,
MCI installed its inmate phone service in prisons throughout California at
no charge to the state. As part of the deal, in exchange for the right to be
the sole provider of telephone services to the prisons, MCI pays the
California Department of Corrections a 32% share of all revenue derived
from the calls.6 MCI adds a three-dollar surcharge to each call.7 The
1. Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, THE ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Dec.
1998, at 51-52, available at http://www.theatlantic.comissues/98dec/prisons.htm.
2. Id. at 63-64.
3. Id. at 63.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. This is standard practice. A 1995 study of state departments of correction
reported that 38 of 41 respondents received commissions from inmate phone systems. See,
[Vol. 54
TELEPHONE SERVICES TO PRISONS
California example is by no means unique; it is the rule, rather than the
exception.
This Article will analyze the efficiency of these contracts, introduce
alternate arrangements, and compare the efficiency of the present contracts
to the alternatives. In so doing, this Article will demonstrate that the
present contracts are inefficient. More specifically, Section II discusses
problems that are unique to the provision of phone service to prisoners, and
introduces the practical shortcomings of the current contracts. The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the source of Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") regulatory jurisdiction, is discussed in Section In.
Section IV introduces a few basic principles used in performing an
efficiency analysis. Section V uses payoff matrices and game theory to
demonstrate how the award process for the contracts causes inefficiencies
to arise and perpetuate indefinitely. Section VI introduces alternate contract
structures and demonstrates that certain alternatives are more efficient than
the present contracts. Section VII contains a brief conclusion that calls for
the FCC to adopt regulation that preempts existing state contracts which are
inconsistent with the most efficient alternate structure.
I. NATURE OF PRESENT CONTRACTS
A. Exclusive Provider Provisions
The contract between the telecommunications provider and the state
typically provides that the telecommunications provider will be the sole
provider for a particular prison or prison system." Parties to these
agreements often cite the high costs of the security systems associated with
the operation of a phone system in a prison as justification for the
exclusive-dealing provisions. Stated differently, the asserted justification is
e.g., JoINT LEGIs. AUDIT AND REvIEw COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMB., REVIEW OF THE
DEP'T OF CoRRECriONS' INMATE TEL. Sys., House Doc. No. 70, 1997 Sess., at 3 (1997),
available at http:lljlarc.state.va.us/reportslrptl99.pdf [hereinafter JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT]. This
Article will refer to the share of the revenue as "commission" or "kickback."
7. Schlosser, supra note 1, at 63.
8. JOINT LEGIS. AUDIT, supra note 6, at 16.
9. David Fischer, Reach Out and Gouge Someone, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, May
5, 1997, at 51. Clearly, a security system is both desirable and necessary. It is imperative
that prisoners be precluded from running a drug ring while in prison, contacting and
tampering with witnesses, and so on. Most if not all states, for example, require that the
prisoner submit a list of persons that the prisoner would like to be able to contact by
telephone. The persons are then investigated, and if approved, the names of those persons
are then placed on the inmate's list. The inmate may contact by telephone only those
persons who are on the approved list. Each inmate is allowed to place a limited number of
persons on the inmate's list at a given time. See FLA. H.R., JusncE COUNCIL, COMM. ON
CORREcTIONS, MANTAINING FAMILY CONTACr WHEN A FAMILY MEMBER GOES TO PRISON:
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that the market is a natural monopoly, or a market that "can be served most
efficiently by a single incumbent finn."'0
There are two reasons why the market is believed to be a natural
monopoly: (1) the provision of telecommunications in general is best
accomplished by one firm; and (2) the costs of the security system make it
impracticable for more than one firm to service a prison. The first reason is
based on bad economics, and as a matter of public policy, it has been
abandoned by Congress." The second reason is factually unsubstantiated as
well as pretextual. At least one state, New Jersey, has authorized
competition in the provision of telephone services to inmates, and in so
doing, the only articulated concerns were security related.'2 The New
Jersey Board articulated no "efficiency" concerns.
The truth is that states stand to earn additional revenue when a
monopoly is providing the service, because the state will receive both a
commission and tax revenue based on the monopoly profits. 3 In fact, most
states are not responsible for operating the security system; that task is
delegated to the service provider. In 1998, New York estimated that the
annual cost of overseeing the maintenance of the phone system, including
the security system, was a mere $283,000.' 4 Incidentally, the New York
State Department of Correctional Service receives a 60% commission from
MCI in exchange for granting MCI the right to be the sole service provider
AN EXAMINATION OF STATE POLICIES ON MAIL, VISITING, AND TELEPHONE ACCESS, at 20-21
(Nov. 1998), at http://www.fcc.state.fl.us/fcc/reports/family.pdf [hereinafter MAINTAINING
FAMILY CONTACT].
10. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY &
PROCEDURE 972 (4th ed. 1999).
11. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
12. Executone Information Systems, Inc., 141 P.U.R. 4th 519 (N.J. Bd. Reg. Comm'rs
Apr. 5, 1993), available at http://www.westlaw.com.
13. For more detail, see infra Part VI.
14. John Sullivan, New York State Earns Top Dollar From Collect Calls by Its Inmates,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at Al. Where the states are responsible for the security system,
the costs are higher. For example, in Oklahoma, the state received $1.9 million in the year
2000, spent $1.2 million on security, and retained a profit of $700,000. Bobby Ross, Jr.,
Cost of Calls May Decrease for Inmates; Board Asks for Change in Prison Phone System,
THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 26, 2001, 4A. According to a press release by Massachusetts
CURE, the average cost of a collect call made in the state of Massachusetts is $0.20 a
minute. In Massachusetts prisons, calls are limited to a length of twenty minutes each. The
minimum cost of a call made out of a prison in the Massachusetts 413 area code is $8.50, or
$0.43 per minute for twenty minutes. Press Release, Massachusetts Cure, Prison Telephone
Charges to 413 Area Triple Those Elsewhere - Rep. Swan Renews Call to Limit Tolls as
National Boycott Begins (Aug. 1, 2000), available at http://www.masscure.org/
pressrelease0800.html (on file with author) [hereinafter Swan Renews Call]. This Article
explores whether the security system used in Massachusetts really doubles the cost of the
calls or whether the 40% kickback imposed by the state does.
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to prisons in New York.'5 In 1998 alone, the Department received $25
million pursuant to this arrangement. 16 The Department has received
approximately $68 million since the inception of the arrangement.' 7 States
often earn tens of millions of dollars in annual revenue from the telephone
agreements, as do the telephone companies.
States also seek to justify the exclusive dealing provisions by
asserting that there is competition for the award of the contract, and the
threat of competition for the contract encourages the telephone service
provider to act as though there is competition for the provision of the
services. This argument is based on the theory of contestable markets.
Where the identity of a monopolist is determined by a competitive bidding
process, and where there is no collusion among bidders, the theory of
contestability holds that the price charged by the monopolist will
approximate that which is charged in a competitive market.18 Because the
price charged by the monopolist is substantially similar to the price that
would be charged in a competitive market, there is no need to regulate the
monopolist.19 There are a number of problems with the application of the
theory to this situation. First, note that for the theory to function properly,
the bidding for the contract must be renewed regularly, because once a firm
begins operating in the market, there is no incentive to price
competitively. 0 It is also important to note that contestability has not
worked well where the sunk costs are high, as they are here.2'
More crucially, the manner in which these contracts are actually
awarded does not fall within the traditional understanding of the
contestability theory, which presumes that the contract will be awarded on
the basis of cost and/or quality of service. Here, the contracts are usually
awarded solely on the basis of which company will provide the state with
the largest commission, and not on the basis of which company will
provide the services at the lowest price. As the award process does not
create an incentive for the firm to behave competitively, this practice is not
15. Associated Press, Suit Targets Rates for Prison Phones, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 2000,
at A32, available at 2000 WL 10003231 [hereinafter Suit Targets Rates].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 973-74.
19. Id.
20. Id at 972. A common term for the contracts is five years, which is probably too long
a time for contestability to affect the behavior of the incumbent.
21. Id. at 973.
22. Fischer, supra note 9, at 52 (noting that the state of Florida awarded a contract to
Sprint after Sprint outbid competitors and offered "to return a stunning 57.5 percent of its
revenues to the state"). Previously, Florida had been receiving a 40% kickback. Id
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in accord with the economic theory of contestability.
B. Calling Options
Even where prisoners are required to place all calls through a
particular provider, prisoners generally do not have the ability to choose
between multiple calling options. The vast majority of states require that all
calls made by inmates be made "collect," and therefore it is the prisoner's
family or friends who actually pay for the call.23 Prepaid calling cards are
generally banned for fear that they contribute to or further a black market
for contraband.24
C. Cost of Calls
The cost of the phone calls varies from state to state, depending on the
amount of the surcharge imposed by the company, the amount of the
kickback to the state, and the amount of the cap to which the rates are
subject. In some states, the rates charged by the telephone company for
collect calls made from prisons are capped at the rate that would be charged
25
on collect calls made from a pay phone outside of prison. Of course, the
surcharges do not count against the cap, so the actual rate charged for calls
from inside a prison still exceeds the rate charged on external calls.
It is also important to note that telephone companies are often
required by regulatory authorities to install and maintain a number of
26public pay phones in the area served by the phone company. The
installation of these pay phones is considered by regulators to be a
compulsory public service, and this service is made mandatory by
regulators who believe that greater access to pay phones increases public
access to 911 emergency service. This requirement is very unpopular with
23. See Global Telcoin, Inc., No. U-20784-B, 1995 WL 59684, at *1 (La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n Jan. 17, 1995) (noting that inmates are not free to choose the operator service or
long-distance carrier of their choice due to concerns about fraud). How fraud would be more
of a problem when the family is responsible for paying the bill is not entirely clear.
Presumably, the family has long-distance service in its residence. Does the Louisiana Public
Service Commission believe that the family can be trusted to pay the long-distance bill from
the regular long-distance provider, but not the bill for the call from the prison? Even if the
answer is yes, does that answer justify the rule precluding a prisoner from choosing a
provider? The rule effectively grants the carrier the power to charge a monopoly price;
presumably, as prices increase, the rate of fraud increases. So perhaps the rule creates the
fraud, which in turn creates the need and justification for the rule.
24. MAINTAINING FAMILY CONTACT, supra note 9, at 24.
25. AT&T Comm. of N.H., Inc., 79 N.H. P.U.C. 639, 639 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n
Nov. 14, 1994), available at 1994 WL 854500. Of course, the rate cap is usually set to
match the highest rate charged at the peak times by any provider in the state.
26. Re Rates and Charges Paid by Pay Telephone Service Providers to Local Exchange
Carriers, Florida Public Service Comm'n, Feb. 14, 1991, 120 P.U.R. 4th 530 at *28.
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telephone companies, which are often required to install and maintain pay
phones in unprofitable locations with low call volume.27 Regulators have
generally been responsive to these concerns and have allowed telephone
companies to increase the rate charged on all pay phones, effectively
allowing the unprofitable pay phones to be subsidized by the profitable
ones.
As noted above, prison pay phones have an inordinately high amount
of call volume, as compared to public pay phones. Where the rates are
capped, they are often capped to match the highest of the rates charged by a
firm providing service outside a prison.2' Also, depending on the state, the
cap inside the prison does not necessarily reflect time of day discounts.
Therefore, even where the rates for collect calls from prisons are capped at
the "outside" rate, the inside rate cap is based on false assumptions about
phone use in the outside market. As a result, the charges for the inside calls
are disproportionately higher than the cost. Inmate challenges to the rates
are generally unsuccessful.
3°
In other situations, the rates are not capped in such a manner that they
correspond to the rates made for outside calls.3 Because the state is not
paying for the calls, it seems reasonable to conclude that it would be less
concerned with the cost of the calls than if it were responsible for paying
the bill. Stated differently, the state receives the benefit of having a service
provided, but does not have the corresponding burden of paying for that
27. Id.
28. Operating Practices of Alternative Operator Serv. Providers, No. U-17957, 1993
WL 561415, at *2 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Sept. 23, 1993) (comparing the rates charged by
four providers, and noting that guidelines required that the rate cap match the highest rate
charged by one of the four).
29. Id. (ordering that the construction given to the rate cap be changed, allowing the
rate cap to be construed to reflect time of day discounts).
30. See, e.g., Jackson v. Taylor, 539 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that
prison officials were immune from an antitrust claim arising out of an alleged practice of
fixing the price of phone calls made from the prison); Comm. Workers of Am. v. Pac. Bell,
61 C.P.U.C.2d 647 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Oct. 5, 1995) (holding that the prison itself is
the customer, and that prisoners were not consumers of a telephone system, and that
therefore, only the prison was guaranteed access under state regulations); Basham v.
Mountaineer Power Sys., No. 92-1026-COCOT-C, 1995 WL 447123, at *9 (W. Va. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n June 15, 1995) (categorizing prisoner complaints into four categories: "those
regarding the type of system offered, those regarding whether the system complies with the
Commission's rules and regulations, those regarding the functioning of the system, and
those regarding the rates charged"). The West Virginia Public Service Commission found
that only those claims dealing with the functioning of the system can be brought by an
inmate before the Commission. Id. Complaints regarding the cost of the service were found
not to be "entertained by the Commission in the context of a complaint case but are instead
reviewed in the service provider's next rate proceeding." Id.
31. MAINTAINING FAMILY CONTACr, supra note 9, at 22.
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benefit. That burden falls on the families of the inmates.
The states and the phone companies seek to justify the cost of the
calls on a number of grounds. Phone companies cite to a high rate of "toll
fraud," where bills are sent to invalid or incorrect addresses.32 Again, why
fraud is more of a problem in the context of calls received from a prison
than in the context of routine long-distance calls is not entirely clear.
33
The cost of the calls can be partially justified by the expensive
security systems that are a necessary component of the prison telephone
systems. Of the asserted justifications, this one has actual merit, for the
security systems are clearly necessary. Nonetheless, one has to question
whether the security systems currently in place are the most cost-efficient
systems available. Since the service provider operates without any real
threat from competition, the provider has fewer incentives to keep costs
low.
Most states are candid enough to admit that the kickbacks they
receive from the service provider do increase the cost of the calls for the
consumer.34 Nonetheless, these states argue that the telephone system is not
without costs, and that it is only fair that those who use the system pay for
part of the costs of the system. Of course, this argument fails to note that
for the state, the system may very well be without costs. As noted above, in
California, MCI installed the entire system at no cost to the state, and MCI
allows state employees to make calls for free. Effectively, the families are
paying for the state's use of the system Isn't it only fair that those who use
the system pay for part of its costs? Note that even where the system is not
without cost to the state, the state earns much more from the system than it
spends on the system.
35
A number of telecommunications providers supplying service to
prisons have engaged in unscrupulous billing practices, such as:
32. See Rates, Terms and Condition for Inmate Telecomm. Serv., No. 368, 1999 WL
179812, at *2 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 15, 1999). This view assumes that an error in
billing must necessarily be the fault of the consumer, and therefore, increased prices are
entirely justified. Note that when the company does not get paid, the consumers are accused
of engaging in fraud. Of course, where the company charges consumers for calls that were
never made or overcharges consumers for calls, then it is not fraud.
33. As prices increase, so does the rate of fraud. Therefore, it is possible that the
structure of the agreements increases the cost of the calls, creating the increased fraud.
Higher rates of fraud in turn create the apparent justification for the higher costs.
34. MAINTAINING FAMILY CONTACT, supra note 9, at 22 (admitting that the cost of the
calls is affected by the "sizable commission" received by the state).
35. Id. at 29. After costs, New York state pocketed $20-21 million from the
commissions in 1997-1998. Id. Are the users merely paying their fair share for
telecommunications service, or are they paying more?
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programming phones to start billing before the recipient accepts the call;36
imposing surcharges in excess of those allowed;37 failing to discount calls
made at off-peak times;38 and charging for unauthorized calls. 39 The
potential for fraud on the part of a provider is exemplified by the recent
behavior of Global Tel*Link Corporation ("Global"), which operates
inmate phone systems in several states. Global was found to have engaged
in a number of illegal activities, including the following: starting the
internal time clock on the phones either 15 or 36 seconds ahead, 40 charging
rates that exceed the authorized rates,4 adding time and money to each
call,42 and billing a call more than once.43 Another provider was found to
36. Equal Access Corp., No. FCU-90-5, 1991 WL 519835, at *3 (Iowa Util. Bd. Feb. 6,
1991).
37. MCI Telecomm. Corp., No. 960617-TI, 1998 WL 391688, at *1 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n June 9, 1998) (noting that MCI imposed surcharges that were, at various times,
$2.00 or $1.25 in excess of the permitted surcharge). This matter also illustrates the
difficulty of dealing with the overcharges. Pursuant to a previous Florida Public Service
Commission order, MCI attempted to issue refunds to those individuals who were
overcharged. Id. A large number of those persons could no longer be located, however. MCI
requested that the funds be placed in a trust fund for prisoner advocacy groups, but the
Commission ordered an immediate rate reduction. Id. As a side note, when MCI sent bills to
invalid addresses, MCI cried "fraud" and went to the Commission.
38. EqualAccess Corp., 1991 WL519835, at *3.
39. Id. at *4. See also La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Quest Correctional Comm., Inc., No.
U-21318, 1996 WL 532269, at *4 (May 14, 1996) (noting that one firm used 309 pay
stations at a prison, but the company only paid for 168 of those lines). This case is not
necessarily important for its impact on the rate charged on inmate calls, but it could impact
the quality of service. Also, it is illustrative of an additional manner in which a provider
could circumvent any applicable regulations.
40. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, No. U-20784, 1995 WL 59684, at *5 (Jan. 7, 1995) (noting
that this programming is made more significant by the fact that Global, as well as most
telephone companies, round up the time of the call to the next minute).
41. Id.
42. Id. at *6 (noting that Global may have used as many as twenty-five different add-on
techniques).
43. Id. at n.5. Apparently, Global would also combine these techniques. For example,
on any particular call, Global may have started the internal clock ahead, charged a rate in
excess of that allowed, added on additional time and money to the call, and then billed the
customer more than once for that same call. The total amount of the overcharges, in
Louisiana alone, was calculated to be $1,243,000. Id. at *11. See also Global Tel*Link
Corp., No. 93-C-0801, 1995 WL 782983 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 11, 1995) (order
approving a reimbursement plan submitted after Global's practices were discovered); Global
Tel*Link Corp., 68 C.P.U.C. 2d 149, at *6 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Sept. 20, 1996) (noting
that on the date of the decision, Global had refunded over $3.4 million). This behavior is not
limited to Global; a different company operating in Louisiana was found to have committed
similar acts: charging customers for two calls that were made at the same time, charging
customers for calls that were not even made from the facility, overcharging calls, and adding
time to calls. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Vendormatic, Inc., No. U-22115, 1998 WL 201681
(La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb. 17, 1998). In any event, the situation could be worse; in Texas
an inmate is allowed to make one collect call every ninety days, so long as the inmate has
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have overbilled two-thirds of the interstate calls made from a particular
prison." In Florida, in a five-year time span, three companies were found to
have overbilled consumers by a total of over $2.7 million.4
D. States' Use of Revenue
States use the revenue derived from the commissions in different
ways. Most states claim to use the funds to offset costs of operating a
prison, either by funding programs operated by the Department of
46Corrections, or by placing the funds in a prisoners' welfare account. For
example, the proceeds may be used to fund health care for prisoners, cash
for work-release, and bus tickets home.47 Interestingly enough, one state
was recently found to have failed to establish "controls to safeguard,
reliably account for, or efficiently use the telephone commission monies
and was using inmate funds for staffing positions not directly related to the
Trust Fund.""
Other states place the funds in the general revenue coffers.49 Where
this is the case, the surcharges on the phone calls can be said to take on the
nature of a regressive tax that is imposed exclusively upon the families of
those who are incarcerated. One has to question whether such a tax regime
is the best method, from a tax policy standpoint, of funding the activities of
the state.
However the funds are ultimately used by the state, one could go even
further than calling the surcharges a "tax." Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes
might suggest that from the point of view of the person paying the
surcharges, the surcharges are not so much a "tax" as they are a "fine."
50
That is, the ultimate consumer would likely view the excessive cost of the
calls as an additional punishment imposed on the consumer for no reason
refrained from violating any prison rules. James M. Odato, Targeting Profits from Prison
Cells, TIMES UNION, Sept. 4, 2000. Texas does not receive a kickback. MAINTAINING
FAMILY CONTACT, supra note 9, at 28-29.
44. See Vendormatic, 1998 WL 201681, at *4 (finding that of the 90,879 tolled calls,
Vendormatic correctly charged 13,849, undercharged 12,157, and overcharged 64,873).
45. MAINTAINING FAMILY CONTACT, supra note 9, at 27.
46. Fischer, supra note 9, at 52.
47. Odato, supra note 43.
48. FLORIDA LEGISLATURE OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY, FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON THE INMATE WELFARE TRUST FUND AND
INSTITUTION-BASED ACCOUNTS ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, No.
96-46 (1997).
49. See Swan Renews Call, supra note 14; Fischer, supra note 9, at 52. See, e.g., JOINT
LEGIS. AUDIT, supra note 6, at 36.
50. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461
(1897).
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other than that a family member of the consumer has been incarcerated.
Looking at the matter in this light would raise a number of justice, fairness,
and perhaps even due process concerns."'
E. The Need to Maximize Access to Telephones
Most prison officials recognize that it is in the best interests of all
parties affected by an incarceration that the incarcerated person maintain
contact with friends and family.5 2 That is, prison officials seem to recognize
that contact with family is very important not just for the prisoner, but also
for the state and the family of the prisoner. Contact with families helps
officials maintain order in the prisons, and it facilitates the prisoner's
reintegration into society. Therefore, the stated goal of many official
policies relating to inmate use of telephones is that prisoner access to
telephones should be maximized.
53
II. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
In 1996, Congress revolutionized the telecommunications market by
passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the Act). The impetus
behind the Act was a finding that "[t]echnological advances would be more
rapid and services would be more widely available and at lower prices if
telecommunications markets were competitive rather than regulated
monopolies. ' 54 In light of this finding, Congress sought to introduce
competition into the telecommunications market, for the purpose of
51. Therefore, most lawmaking bodies would likely look at the matter from an entirely
different perspective. Most certainly, the phone companies and the states that receive a
commission would not take this point of view.
52. See Rates, Terms, and Condition for Inmate Telecomm. Servs., No. 368, 1999 WL
179812, at *1 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Jan. 15, 1999). The Department of Corrections
testified before the Commission that the Department intended that those who pay for collect
phone calls made from prisons pay no more than the amount for a similar call made from
outside the prison. Id See also Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. All Customer-owned, Coin-
Operated Tel. Serv. Providers Serving Confinement Facilities, No. 23871, 1995 WL
337071, at *1-2 (Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n May 1, 1995) (citing testimony of an economic
expert retained by the Alabama Attorney General's Office who testified that no valid
purpose would be served by establishing higher rates for inmate phone calls). In both cases,
the Public Service Commissions agreed to cap the rates on calls made from prison to match
outside rates. Rates, Terms, and Condition for Inmate Telecomm. Serv., 1999 WL 179812,
at *3; Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 1995 WL 337071, at *5.
53. One has to wonder how often the actual attitudes of prison officials reflect this
stated policy. Upon receiving information that the state had just been sued for allegedly
monopolizing the provision of telephone services to prisoners, one state official's only
response was that "[i]nmates do not have a constitutional right to make phone calls." Suit
Targets Rates, supra note 15.
54. H.R. REp. No. 104-204, at 48 (1995).
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protecting consumers from potential monopoly abuses.55 To promote
competition, Congress removed state and local barriers to entry, required
providers to interconnect with competitors, and placed an affirmative duty
on the commission and the states to ensure that universal service is
available at rates that are just, reasonable, and affordable. These changes
will be analyzed individually.
A. Removal of Barriers to Entry
With respect to the removal of the state and local barriers to entry, the
Act has broad provisions for the preemption of state and local regulations
that impede the Act's operation. The Act provides: "No State or local
statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit
or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any
interstate or intrastate telecommunications service., 6 These provisions
grant the FCC the authority to set aside any state law that is deemed
inconsistent with the Act's purpose."
Clearly, by allowing only one company to be the provider of service
to a prison, the state has put into place a "legal requirement" that prevents
entry into the market. This legal requirement is essentially a government-
granted monopoly. Section 253(a) of the Act is directed squarely against
this practice, because the practice is inconsistent with free entry into the
market. Further, the state requirement conflicts with the congressional
belief that technological advances would be more rapid, and services would
be available at lower prices, if telecommunications markets were
competitive marketplaces rather than regulated monopolies.
B. Interconnection
Congress further imposed a general duty on telecommunications
providers to interconnect with the facilities and equipment of other
telecommunications providers." The incumbent is to be compensated by
55. Id.
56. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. V 1999).
57. See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a), (d) (Supp. V 1999). See also S. REP. No. 104-230, at 126
(1996) (noting that the bill preempts almost all state and local barriers to competition).
58. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(a) (Supp. V 1999); 47 C.F.R. § 51.305 (2000). Note that §
251(a) requires a provider to share infrastructure and facilities. Section 251(b)(4) imposes
the duty to afford access to rights-of-way, poles, conduits, and ducts. 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(4)
(Supp. V 1999). However, local exchange carriers would "not be required to take any action
that is economically unreasonable or that is contrary to the public interest." 47 C.F.R. §
59.2(a) (2000). The obligation to negotiate interconnection applies to a local exchange
carrier that is determined by the FCC to have market power in providing exchange services.
S. REP. No. 104-230, at 117 (1996). The Act creates the potential for competition where
formerly there was a natural monopoly.
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the competitor at reasonable terms, which generally has been construed to
mean at the costs of the incumbent. 9 Essentially, these provisions require a
provider to lease its facilities to a rival. The provisions are designed to
allow rivals to enter the market without sustaining a substantial amount of
sunk or fixed costs up front; when the rival leases access, these costs are
allocated over time. Therefore, the provision lowers a barrier to entry,
thereby promoting competition in the market.
The interconnection provisions, if applied to the contracts, would
require an incumbent to lease the necessary facilities and lines to a rival.
Theoretically, both providers could share everything, even the already
existing security system. Recall that the states seek to justify the exclusive
dealing provisions by asserting that the costs are too high for two firms to
both install and operate systems. But by interconnecting and using one
system, two firms could compete without incurring the expenses associated
with installing and operating two duplicative systems. Further, it is likely
that competitive pressures would force each firm to drive down costs. 60 If
so, then it is possible that two firms could operate at lower cost than a
single firm. Finally, note that the exclusive dealing provisions also prevent
interconnection.
C. Universal Service at Just Rates
To effectuate the ultimate goal of promoting consumer welfare,
Congress imposed an affirmative duty on the states to prevent
unnecessarily high rates from being charged. Specifically, the Act provides
that "[t]he Commission and the States should ensure that universal service
is available at rates that are just, reasonable, and affordable. 61 Therefore, it
is not sufficient for the states to promote competition; the states must also
take affirmative action to ensure that all consumers have access to service
at reasonable rates. The states have violated this duty in three material
respects: by requiring that a commission be paid to the state, by allowing
the provider to impose additional surcharges (which in part pay for the
commission), and by granting a monopoly to the provider. The states have
violated this duty because it is profitable for them to do so, not because the
present situation is beneficial to consumers. This practice is in direct
59. Some question has arisen as to how "costs" should be measured. See, e.g., William
J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract,
and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1037, 1039 (1997) (arguing
that efficiency requires pricing by forward-looking costs, and that the Takings Clause does
not preclude pricing on a forward-looking basis).
60. What costs are left? Managerial, administrative, billing, and any other costs which
do not pertain directly to the costs associated with the lines and facilities.
61. 47 U.S.C. § 254(i) (Supp. V 1999).
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conflict with the congressionally imposed obligation to ensure that service
is provided at reasonable and affordable rates.
Ultimately, one is left with the distinct impression that state
requirements are in direct conflict with both the plain terms and the spirit of
the Act. Consequently, the FCC should exercise the powers conferred by
the Act, and preempt any state contract that requires a commission to be
paid to the state, or that grants a monopoly to a provider.
IV. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS
The alleged superiority of law and economics, as a body of
jurisprudence, is based on the fact that it uses economics to test the validity
and/or efficacy of rules, and the fact that economics is a less subjective
measure than those measures employed by rival jurisprudential theories.62
Generally speaking, law and economics suggests that the role of the law is
to maximize wealth, and that all laws should be construed so as to
maximize wealth. Wealth maximization is, by some, measured in dollars;
dollars are less subjective than general notions of "justice" or "fairness."
Therefore, an efficiency analysis performed on two competing pieces of
legislation, for example, is a less subjective measure of the merits of the
proposed laws than a discussion about the comparative justice of the
respective proposals, or the impact of the proposals on natural rights.
Whose wealth is sought to be maximized: consumer wealth or social
wealth? What is the difference between the two? Social welfare is defined
as the sum of consumer welfare and producer welfare. The distinction
between the two is important because they may not necessarily point in the
same direction. A particular policy may enhance social wealth but
adversely affect consumer wealth, or vice versa. Those who subscribe to
law and economics would generally assert that maximization of wealth
should be analyzed in terms of social welfare.6' The issue arises, however,
because the current approach in both antitrust jurisprudence and
telecommunications law generally involves looking to consumer welfare.6
4
Perfect competition maximizes consumer welfare better than
monopoly. Competition is also preferable to regulation, perhaps even
where it is a natural monopoly that is being regulated. 6' Therefore,
62. There is at least some merit to this assertion. It is probably easier to prove that a
particular rule is inefficient than it is to prove that the same rule is unjust.
63. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS 18-20 (1970)
64. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 81
(1978).
65. At least, this Article posits that this must be Congress's belief, for this is really the
only justification for the Act.
[Vol. 54
TELEPHONE SERVICES TO PRISONS
competition generally maximizes consumer welfare better than monopoly
or natural monopoly.
The diagram below depicts the economic consequences of the current
structure of the contracts. 6 In it, the label "P" denotes the price that
would be charged by a monopoly. Similarly, "MP*" denotes the monopoly
price when a commission is required by the state. "CP" refers to the
competitive price, and "CP*" refers to the competitive price when a
commission is required. "MQ" refers to the quantity that a monopoly
would be expected to produce. "MQ*" denotes the quantity produced by a
monopoly when a commission is imposed. "MC" represents the marginal
cost of production. "CQ" represents the quantity produced when there is
competition. And, finally, "CQ*" represents the quantity produced when
there is competition and a commission is imposed.
Figure 1. Prices Charged by Monopoly and Competitive Firms
MCI
MP - ---- MCMP
CP
Demand
I !I I
I I
MI M CQ" CQ Quantity
MR
A monopolist will produce its goods at a level such that marginal
revenue equals marginal cost. Therefore, the amount produced by a
monopoly may be determined by locating (on Figure 1) the intersection of
the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves. Note, however, that the
actual price charged by a monopoly is that which corresponds to the
demand for the amount produced. Accordingly, the price charged by a
monopoly may be determined by drawing a vertical line from the
intersection of the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves to the
66. See SULLivAN & HovEN- AP, supra note 10, at 61-62.
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demand curve. Therefore, the circles depict the price charged and the
quantity produced by a monopolist. Contrast the output of and price
charged by a monopoly to that of a firm operating in a competitive
environment. A firm operating in a competitive market will produce its
goods such that the market price equals the marginal cost of production.
Stated differently, in competition, firms will also price their goods at the
price that corresponds to the intersection of the marginal cost and demand
curves. Therefore, the rectangles in the diagram depict the price charged
and quantity produced by a firm operating in a competitive market. Clearly,
competition results in a lower price and higher output than a monopoly.
The upward shift in the marginal cost curve represents the effect of a
kickback. The consequences of the imposition of the kickback are higher
prices and less output. Clearly, from the perspective of the consumer, a
monopoly and commission are disfavored. But consumer dislike for a
policy does not necessary imply that the policy is detrimental to social
welfare. Recall that social welfare takes into consideration the effect of the
policy on the consumers and the producers. If the consumers are harmed to
the extent of X, and the producers are benefited to the extent of X, then the
policy simply causes a transfer of wealth from the consumers to the
producers; in the aggregate, the policy does not adversely affect the social
welfare. In other words, because the policy does not adversely affect the
social welfare it is not to be condemned on those grounds.
From the social welfare perspective, is the monopoly, or the
commission, preferable to the alternatives? There are two theories that may
be used to answer this question. The theory of Pareto Optimality states that
a new rule is superior to the old when the new rule improves at least one
person's position and no person's position is devalued by the rule's
adoption.67 The principal shortcoming of this theory is that it has limited
application. Often, someone will lose under the new rule, and even if the
amount of the loss is negligible, the theory is unable to evaluate the value
of the new rule.
An alternate approach is taken by the Kauldor-Hicks theory. This
theory holds that a new rule is superior to the old rule when the winners
(under the new rule) gain more than the losers lose.68 Judge Posner
modifies this theory in one important respect: Posner asserts that a legal
rule is wealth maximizing if the winners would be willing to pay more for
its adoption than the losers would be willing to pay for the rule not to be
67. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 12, 43 (3d ed. 2000); DAN
DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 30 (2d ed. 1993).
68. DOBBS, supra note 67, at 30; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 67, at 44.
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adopted.69 It is crucial to note that the winner does not actually have to pay
the loser. As long as payment is theoretically possible, the rule is wealth
maximizing. Willingness to pay is one measure of people's preferences,
and it is easier to measure "dollars versus dollars" than it is to measure
"preferences versus preferences." In this respect, Posner's version of the
Kauldor-Hicks theory is superior (in its application) to the traditional
formulation of Kauldor-Hicks. Accordingly, this Article will define wealth
maximization in terms of Posner's version of Kauldor-Hicks efficiency.
Concerns of "fairness" will be given no weight in assessing the various
•• 70
policies.
V. STRUCTURE OF THE CONTRACTS AND GAME THEORY
This Section consists of two subsections. The first subsection will
develop a series of payoff matrices, and use the matrices to show how the
existing structure of the contracts arose. The second subsection will use
game theory to demonstrate that the award process causes the inefficiencies
of the current contracts to perpetuate.
A. The Payoff Matrix
A payoff matrix is a simple device. Here, two matrices will be used to
depict the incentives to the state for adopting a particular structure to the
contracts. The first matrix illustrates the incentives to the state for
structuring the contract so the state receives a commission on the revenues
derived by the telephone company. The second matrix depicts the
incentives for structuring the agreement so a single telephone company will
provide the service.
1. State Incentives for Requiring Commissions
In Table 1, the left column depicts the potential political gain that may
be derived from structuring the contracts in a particular manner.7' Note that
69. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUDiEs 103, 119-22 (1979).
70. According to Kaplow and Shavell, a normative assessment of legal policy should be
driven exclusively by considerations of social welfare, and notions of fairness should be
given no independent weight in assessing the policy. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARv. L. Rv. 961, 966 (2001).
71. Political gain is the political currency or benefit the state receives when it grants
benefits to its residents. There is an inherent difficulty in attempting to measure the political
gain to the state. This difficulty is augmented when one seeks to compare the projected
political gain to the financial gain, and to determine which is greater. One measure of
political loss (or gain) to the state is the negative value of the financial gain (or loss) to the
state. That is, if the state passes a tax that benefits the state to the extent of "3" (dollars or
units), then the state has caused the consumer to incur a financial loss of "3." Since the state
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if the state continues to require the commission, the state sustains a political
loss of"l."
Table 1. Incentives for requiring commissions
Political Gain Financial Gain Total Gain
Kickback -1 4 3
No Kickback 1 -4 -3
The families of prisoners are the only group harmed by this policy;
they are not an organized body, nor are they seen as a particularly
sympathetic group. Similarly, the state may derive some political gain from
structuring the contract in favor of the families, but the gain would not be
significant. The company is largely ambivalent about the requirement of
the kickback, because most of the cost of the commission can be passed on
to the consumer in the form of surcharges.72
The right column in Table 1 represents the potential financial gain to
the state. As the table indicates, the state can require the commission, and
thereby derive a financial gain of "4," and a total gain of "3."
If the state waives the commission, the state suffers a financial loss to the
extent of the forgone commission.7 ' The total loss if the state waives the
commission is "3." The state clearly has a strong financial incentive to
has imposed this financial loss on the consumer, the state suffers a political loss of "3"
because the consumer's political support of the state wanes when the consumer is made to
pay the state.
This approach is not without defects. First of all, a person's political support of the
state is not necessarily based on, or even influenced by, one decision made by the state.
Further, the state receives the aggregate amount derived from the individual payments made
by all the consumers. If used properly, this aggregate amount can benefit the state more than
the smaller amounts benefited the individuals. While there is probably an inverse
relationship between political support and financial costs imposed on consumers, it is
unlikely that the relationship is a one-to-one ratio. When the Postal Service increases the
price of a stamp by a penny, for example, my political support of the Postal Service does not
fall by a corresponding amount. To the consumer, the loss of one penny is miniscule; but the
Postal Service's loss of everyone's pennies matters a great deal. In the situation of the phone
contracts loss is imposed on a group that does not wield great political clout. Therefore, the
state does not suffer a substantial political loss when it imposes a financial loss on this
particular group. For purposes of this illustration, the Author assumes that the ratio between
financial gain to the state and political loss to the state is four to one. Therefore, the state
will have a financial gain of four and political loss of one.
72. Of course an additional surcharge would result in higher total prices, causing
demand for the service to fall and a loss of sales for the company. In this particular market,
however, it is likely that the demand is not very responsive to price changes.
73. The lost commission is an opportunity cost. This cost must be factored in because
the state will have to replace the lost commission.
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require that the telephone company pay a commission. As political
incentives are substantially outweighed by financial incentives, a rational
state will require a commission.
2. Incentives for Utilizing an Exclusive Dealing Provision
In Table 2, the column on the left depicts the estimated net political
gain or loss. Three groups will exert political pressure on the state:
families, the incumbent, and the prospective competitor. As before, the
value of the political loss (or gain) to the state is generally equal to the
negative value of the financial gain (or loss) to the constituents.74
Table 2. Incentives for Utilizing an Exclusive Dealing Provision
Political Gain Financial Gain Total Gain
Exclusive -0.073 $0.083 0.01
Non-exclusive 0.073 -$0.083 -0.01
Assume that a monopolist can charge a monopoly price and derive a
profit of $0.25 on each phone call. If there is competition, then the
incumbent can no longer charge a monopoly price. The incumbent will be
forced to accept a lower profit level of $0.15 per phone call. Therefore, an
incumbent stands to have a financial gain of $0.10 per phone call if the
state grants the incumbent a monopoly.
75
If the competitor is allowed to enter the market, the competitor will
earn $0.15 per phone call. Conversely, if the competitor is never allowed to
access the market, then the competitor loses the opportunity to derive $0.15
in revenue. This lost opportunity has a value equal to the lost revenue.
Therefore, the competitor will lose $0.15 if the state grants a monopoly to
the incumbent.
As discussed infra, the cost difference between monopoly and
competition, to the consumer, is $0.225. Accordingly, the consumer will
incur a financial loss of $0.225 if the state grants a monopoly. For the
reasons previously discussed, however, the political loss incurred by the
state because of monopoly will be much less than the direct financial loss
76incurred by the consumer. In this hypothetical, the political loss is valued
74. Although the political gain (or loss) is calculated on the basis of the negative value
of the financial loss (or gain), the political gain is not adjusted to reflect tax consequences
(i.e., the state's financial gains will factor in additional tax revenue). The Author does not
believe that this difference in the calculation of the gains or losses undermines the analysis.
75. These numbers are the same as those used in the schematics in Part VI, infra.
76. Again, it is unlikely that there is a one-to-one ratio in this scenario. The families are
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at $0.023."7
Therefore, the political loss incurred by the state, when the state
grants a monopoly, is calculated as follows:
0.10 - 0.15 - 0.023 = -0.073.
The political gain derived from permitting competition is calculated
in the same manner, but by using the negative values of the same numbers:
-0.10 + 0.15 + 0.023 = 0.073.
The middle column in Table 2 depicts the direct financial gain that
may be derived by the state if the telephone company is allowed to be the
exclusive service provider. If the state grants a monopoly, then the state
will derive $0.25 in revenue from the commission charged to a monopolist.
But the state will also earn a commission if the state allows competition.
Therefore, to determine the financial gain derived solely from the grant of
monopoly, one must first take the difference in the commission between
monopoly and competition. If the commission derived by the state in the
context of a monopoly is $0.25 per call, and the commission derived from a
single phone call in a competitive environment is $0.175, then the
difference is as follows:
$0.25 - $0.175 = $0.075.
The state will also receive income tax78 from the profit derived by the
company. The additional amount of tax from granting a monopoly" at a
10% tax rate is calculated as follows:
$0.075 X 10% = $0.008.
Finally, the state's revenue is calculated by adding the tax revenue to
the amount of the commission:
$0.075 + $0.008 = $0.083.
Consequently, the state has a financial incentive of $0.083 to grant a
monopoly. If the state refrains from granting a monopoly, then the state
incurs an opportunity cost of $0.083. When the financial incentives are
unorganized, politically weak, and perhaps even uninformed about the effect of monopoly.
The state may more easily justify the monopoly than the commission. Further, a monopoly
is less likely to inflame the public than a commission. That is, the requirement of the
commission may appear to the public as driven by greed, bad tax policy, or bad money
management. All of the state's justifications for the commission revolve around the need to
generate revenue, and this is rarely popular. The state can more easily justify a monopoly to
the American public, which is easily confused by rhetoric (even where the rhetoric is
baseless). The Author therefore assumes that on this particular issue, the ratio of political
loss to financial gain is ten to one.
77. $0.225 / 10 - 0.023.
78. This assumes a 10% tax on net income.
79. Monopoly profit is higher than the profit derived by a firm operating in a
competitive market. When the state grants a monopoly, they are able to tax this higher profit
level.
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considered in conjunction with the political incentives, it is apparent that
the state, when acting to maximize its own welfare, will grant a monopoly.
When examined in the aggregate, these financial incentives are far
from trivial. Tables 1 and 2 are calculated on a per-call basis,' ° but as of
1998 nearly two million persons were incarcerated nationwide. If each
inmate makes one call per week on average, the numbers above can be
multiplied by 104 million to reflect the number of calls placed in one year.
Taken together, Tables 1 and 2 indicate that the state has both
political and financial incentives to require a commission and to grant a
monopoly to the telecommunications service provider. A rational state will
act on these incentives and structure the contracts accordingly. Unless the
underlying incentives change, this behavior will continue indefinitely.
B. Game Theory in the Awarding of Contracts
Game theory is an economic theory that can be used to gain insight into
legal rules. The theory is used to identify the optimal strategy for one actor
when the conduct of that actor depends on a course of conduct chosen by
another actor.81 As applied to the present contracts between the state and
the telecommunications provider, game theory will demonstrate that the
award process perpetuates the inefficiencies of current contracts. Game
theory will show that the award process creates a permanent market failure
that will not correct itself until the process is modified.
Assume that there are only two firms competing, Company X and
Company Y. Each competes for a single contract. Further assume that both
X and Y know that the state will award the contract on the basis of the size
of the kickback offered to it. The companies are both motivated by profit,
and therefore each will conduct itself to maximize its own profit.
80. Also note that the "cost of the call," as used here, is much lower than the actual cost
in the real world.
81. See COOTER& ULEN, supra note 67, at 34-38.
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Table 3. Game theory in the award of contracts
Company X
Large Small
Commission Commission
Company Large A C
Y Commission (High, High) (Low, High)
Small B D
Commission (High, Low) (Low, Low)
The choice variable for each firm is the commission offered to the
state. The firms may offer either a large commission or a small one. The
terms of "high" and "low" in Table 3 indicate the payoff for each firm
12under each choice, given the choice of their rival . In the context of this
game, the large commission strictly dominates the low commission for
each firm. The payoff to Company X when choosing a large commission is
greater than when choosing a small commission, regardless of the bidding
strategy of Company Y. The same is true for Company X. Both firms will
therefore choose the high commission, competitive outcome "A." While
both would be marginally better off if they would choose to cooperate,
there is no incentive to cooperate because there is no guarantee that a rival
firm will also choose the cooperative solution. Each firm chooses the
competitive solution because they are better off than if they cooperated, but
their rival did not.
The solution to this game highlights a fundamental defect in the
award process. Taken as a whole, the award process inevitably leads to a
contract containing an exclusive dealing provision and a high commission
for the state. With the telephone company and the state acting rationally in
their own best interests, the consumer inevitably loses. Until the incentives
change, or until the state begins to elevate the interests of the consumer
above those of the state, this situation will continue indefinitely. This is a
82. The payoff for a large commission is "high" because by offering a high
commission, the firm is more likely to be awarded the contract. Since the
telecommunications service provider does not pay the cost of the commission itself, the fact
that the commission is high does not reduce the payoff to the firm. If the firm were the only
bidder, it would offer a low kickback, because the lower the kickback, the higher the
demand for making calls.
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permanent nontransitory market failure.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRACTS
This Section will introduce alternative structures to the contracts, and
then determine whether the adoption of an alternate structure would be an
efficiency-enhancing move. To provide a meaningful frame of reference,
the discussion will begin with a brief analysis of the present contracts. In
the discussion of each alternative, a number of simplifying assumptions
will be made. These assumptions will remain the same in the analysis of
each alternative.
The company is assumed to be responsible for the full cost of the
security system, and this cost is included in the company's total cost in
administering the contract. Where the state requires a commission, the
commission will be calculated as 50% of gross revenues. The commission
is passed directly on to the consumer in the form of a surcharge added to
the cost of the call. Where the state waives the commission, the surcharge
is eliminated. Assume that the state imposes a tax of 10% on the net
income of the provider(s). Further, and perhaps most importantly, the
analyses of the competitive arrangements presume that the market is not a
natural monopoly.
81
Finally, each structure will be analyzed in terms of the cost of, or
revenue derived from, a single phone call. Two phone calls will be depicted
in a situation where competition is permitted, only to illustrate the effect of
competition. However, where two calls are depicted, the analysis will still
focus on costs and revenues associated with one call.
A. Present Contracts
Figure 2 illustrates the structure of the present contracts. The individual
pays $0.75 for a phone call. Of this amount, $0.25 represents the
commission, and this amount passes through the company to the state. The
remaining $0.50 is retained by the telephone company. Of that amount,
$0.25 is allocated to the costs incurred by the company in providing the
services, and $0.25 represents the monopoly profit retained by the
company.
The profit of $0.25 is taxed by the state at the rate of 10%.
Therefore, the state derives $0.025 in tax revenue, and $0.275 in total
revenue.
83. Proving the validity of this assumption is beyond the scope of this paper. The
Author believes the assumption accurately reflects the actual operation of the market. The
evidence supporting the assertion of natural monopoly is weak. See infra Section II.A.
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Figure 2. Diagram of present contracts
$0.25 profit
$0.25 Kickback $0.25 cost
State Company
T $0.75
Individual
B. No Kickback, Competition
Consider a situation where the state forgoes the kickback and allows
competition to be introduced. In this scenario, illustrated in Figure 3, the
individual pays $0.35 for the phone call. Of that sum, the company retains
$0.15 profit, and $0.20 is allocated to cover the costs of providing the
service. The company's total cost of providing the service falls from $0.25
to $0.20. The cost savings are driven by the threat of competition and the
related need to increase efficiency and to reduce costs. Also, after a
competitor has been introduced, the incumbent may pass on a portion of
sunk costs to the challenger, reducing the incumbent's fixed CoStS.
8 4
Competition forces the companies to accept a lower profit level, and
therefore only $0.15 of profit is retained by the company.
84. This prediction assumes that the companies are subject to a regime like the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires an incumbent to lease access to a
competitor. The lease payments are driven by the incumbent's costs. Presumably, when the
incumbent acquired the contract, the incumbent incurred a high number of one-time
expenses. Under traditional accounting techniques, these expenses can be proportionally
allocated to each call. Therefore, when the challenger leases access to the system, the
incumbent may pass these expenses onto the challenger, effectively relieving the incumbent
from incurring those expenses.
85. As prices continue to fall, consumer use of the system will increase, and companies'
fixed costs may therefore be allocated over a greater number of calls, although variable
costs will increase.
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Figure 3. Diagram of competition without kickback
No kickback $0.15 profit $0.15 profit$0.20 cost $0.20 cost
State Company Company
$0.35 $0.35
Individual Individual
As Figure 3 illustrates, the state earns no revenue from commissions,
but it taxes the company's revenue of $0.15. Therefore, the state derives
revenues of $0.015. For the consumer, the cost of the telephone call has
fallen from $0.75 to $0.35, saving her $0.40. Therefore, this scenario is a
significant improvement from a consumer welfare point of view.
There is also room for a bargain in this situation. That is, this scenario
represents a change that would increase the social welfare. The caller
would theoretically pay up to $0.40 to acquire this arrangement, because
she will save this amount on the cost of a call. Therefore, if the caller paid
$0.39 for this arrangement, then she would be better off by $0.01. The
telephone company would require at least $0.10 to offset the loss of profit,
and the state would require at least $0.26 to forgo the kickback and the
taxes imposed on monopoly profits.
$0.40 > $0.26 + $0.10.
Consequently, the individual could pay the state and the company
these amounts, and the social welfare would be improved by an amount
between $0.02 and $0.05, depending on the precise nature of the bargain
struck by the parties.
The adoption of this structure would be an efficiency-enhancing
move. It is important to note that the individual need not actually
compensate the state or the company. As long as compensation is
theoretically possible, the new regime is an improvement over the old.
Note also that this structure most closely resembles the public policy
of the Act. Here, there are no state barriers to entry in the
telecommunications market. This structure also most advances consumer
welfare by "ensur[ing] that universal service is available at rates that are
just, reasonable, and affordable. '86
86. 47 U.S.C. § 254(i) (Supp. V 1999).
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C. Kickback, Competition
In this scenario, presented in Figure 4, the state continues to require a
commission, but it allows competition to be introduced. The company's
costs fall to $0.20,87 and the threat of competition forces the telephone
company to accept a lower level of profits. Therefore, the company's gross
revenues are $0.35. The state earns $0.015 in tax revenue and a
commission of $0.175. Accordingly, total state revenue is $0.19. The
commission is passed on to the consumer. Therefore, the individual pays
$0.525 for a phone call.
Figure 4. Diagram of competition with kickback
$0.15 profit $0.15 profit
$0.175 kickback $0.20 cost $0.20 cost
State Company Company
'$0.1 75 kickback a. A
$0.525 $0.525
Individual Individual
In the present-day situation (the scenario presented in Section VI.A,
with a kickback and no competition), the cost of the call is $0.75. Recall
that in the first alternative (presented in Section VI.B, with no kickback and
competition), the cost of the call is $0.35. In the second alternative,
presented in Figure 4, the cost is $0.525. From a consumer welfare
perspective, this alternative is clearly preferable to the first, but the second
maximizes consumer welfare better than the first and current-day
arrangement.
As the consumer would save $0.225 in this option over the current
situation, he would be willing to pay up to $0.225 for this alternative. The
state would require $0.085 to offset the loss in kickback and taxes. The
company would require $0.10 to offset the loss in profit.
$0.225 > $0.10 + $0.085.
Note that here, too, there is room for a bargain; the consumer could
pay the state and the telephone company these amounts, and social welfare
would be improved by $0.04. Therefore, this arrangement also enhances
87. The costs fall for the reasons discussed in the previous scenario. See supra Part
VI.B.
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consumer welfare and social welfare.
D. State-Owned Enterprise
This alternative, represented by Figure 5, depicts a situation in which
the state would assume the role of the private company and provide the
services directly to the individual.
Figure 5. Diagram of state-owned enterprise
No revenue
State Company
$0.35 cost rP
$0.35
Individual
As the state would be responsible for the operation of the phone
system, the system itself would presumably be less efficient than a similar
system operated by a private firm. Consequently, the state operates at a
higher cost level, $0.35, than does the private company. The consumer
would only pay $0.35 for a phone call, however. This scenario would also
bring about an improvement in consumer welfare from the present-day
situation.
In order to adopt such an arrangement, the state would require the
consumer to pay an additional $0.275 to compensate the state for the loss
of kickback and taxes, and the company would require the consumer to pay
$0.25 to replace the forgone profits. The consumer would be willing to pay
up to $0.40, but no more than that.
$0.40 < $0.275 + $0.25.
Therefore, there is no room for a bargain here. Consequently, while
this arrangement would not enhance social welfare, it would enhance
consumer welfare.
E. Comparison of Approaches
How the four aforementioned approaches compare to one another is
presented in Table 4.
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Table 4. Comparison of approaches
Present No Kickback, State-
Contracts Kickback, Competition owned
Competition enterprise
Company $0.25 $0.15 $0.15 $0
State $0.275 $0.015 $0.19 $0
Individual -$0.75 -$0.35 -$0.525 -$0.35
Net Social -$0.23 -$0.185 -$0.185 -$0.35
Gain/Loss
Of the available options presented, either "competitive" regime is
more efficient than the present structure, from a Kauldor-Hicks standpoint.
This is so because both competitive regimes minimize the net social loss
better than the present regime does. A lesser amount of social loss is really
a social gain.
As between the two competitive regimes, the second scenario (no
kickback, competition) is clearly superior from a consumer welfare point of
view. The first alternative would bring about a 50% reduction in the cost of
the call to the consumer, whereas the second alternative would bring about
a 30% reduction.
However, both actors involved in making the structural decision-the
state and the company-prefer the present structure to any other. Table 4
illustrates why. Note that if the state maintains the status quo, the state will
receive $0.275 in revenue. If the state moves to the first alternative, which
would be better for the consumer, then the state will derive only 5% of the
revenue it formerly derived.88 By moving to the second scenario, the
company will realize 60% of its former profit level.' 9 Neither the state nor
the company has a financial incentive to make this change, no matter how
inefficient or harmful to consumers the present structure may be.
If it is theoretically possible for consumers to purchase a more
competitive regime, then why do they not do so? There are a number of
possible reasons. First, the consumers are probably unorganized, and any
purchasing decision would require a great deal of cooperation. Second,
88. $0.015 / $0.275 - $0.05.
89. $0.15 /$0.25 = $0.60.
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there is a cost to organizing. Third, there are transaction costs of
negotiating a deal. It is possible that these costs are so high that they
preclude a deal from being reached. Fourth, it is possible that the
consumers lack information: they may not know of the possibility of
reaching a bargain, how to organize, or who to contact to set up the
transaction.
VII. CONCLUSION
The present state of affairs is inefficient. It came about because the state
and the company entered into a third-party beneficiary contract, and in so
doing, both actors focused only on their own welfare and neglected the so-
called "beneficiary" of the contract. Ultimately, the problem with the present
situation is that this behavior is entirely rational for both the states and the
telephone companies. That is, it is reasonable to expect the states and the
companies to place their own welfare before that of other parties. Economics
presumes that actors will generally act to maximize their own welfare, and
this is exactly what the states and the companies have done. In this particular
context, however, the conduct of the states has created inefficiencies, which,
by definition, are wasteful and socially harmful. If the goal of law is to
minimize inefficiencies, then new regulation is appropriate.
The letter and the spirit of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 gives
the FCC the power to regulate these contracts. The FCC should exercise this
power by preempting and regulating those contracts that grant a monopoly or
require that a commission be paid to the state.
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